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EU COMPETITION LAW POLICY VERSUS INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A STUDY OF THE MICROSOFT CASE
Irena Tušek*
...there is probably a greater global consensus on the desirability of 
competition and free markets today than at any time in the history of 
human economic behaviour.1
Summary: The constant tension between intellectual property rights 
and competition policy has recently culminated in the Microsoft case. 
This article examines the tests applied by the European Commission 
and CFI in finding Microsoft’s behaviour tantamount to the abuse of 
dominant position – are those tests precise and easily applicable, do 
they result in legal certainty, and do they only result in more competi-
tion in the short term, while having far-reaching consequences on the 
exercise of  IPRs? In particular, this article examines the requirements 
of indispensability and new product in the part of the case concerning 
the interoperability issue, but also analyses the Commission’s asse-
ssment of the two separate products element of the test applied in the 
part of the judgement concerning tying. Finally, the article stresses the 
need to establish new or redefine the present tests in judging whether 
the behaviour of a dominant undertaking amounts to the abuse of 
dominant position.            
1. Introduction
Competition – a game in which some competitors win, and some 
lose; a game that can have far-reaching consequences, whether econo-
mic, social, environmental, or other. Competition allows competitors to 
use all permitted means to prevail in the constant process of rivalry. 
Victory means more wealth for the winner(s) and a greater share of the 
market. 
One of the means of competing is innovation, a process as innate to 
mankind as competition itself.
EU competition law policy goes hand in hand with the creation of the 
single European market, by facilitating its creation and preventing it from 
1 Richard Whish, Competition Law (6th edn OUP, Oxford 2009) 18.
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being hindered by the behaviour of undertakings holding a dominant po-
sition. The role of competition is expressly stated in art 101 para 1 (ex art 
81 EC) and art 102 para 1 (ex art 82 EC) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union2 (hereinafter: TFEU).
On the other hand, protection of intellectual property can be found 
in all national legislations and constitutional traditions of the Member 
States and is also recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union3 of 7 December 2000, as adapted in Strasbourg on 
12 December 2007, giving the Charter the same legal value as the Tre-
aties (TFEU and TEU4) as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon (1 December 2009).5 Art 17 of the Charter recognises the right to 
property, a value common to all Member States, and in the second para-
graph it states in particular that intellectual property shall be protected. 
However, intellectual property rights in the EU arise from the different 
legal systems of Member States, and this causes problems in terms of 
achieving the goal of single market integration. Nevertheless, harmoni-
sation in the field of intellectual property rights (copyrights, trademarks, 
patents, etc), by virtue of EU legislation and the European Court of Justi-
ce case law (now the Court of Justice of the European Union), is reducing 
barriers to the functioning of the single internal market. 
In this paper, the author will examine only one intellectual property 
right - copyright – more precisely, copyright for a computer program, in 
relation to the existence and exercise of that right by a dominant un-
dertaking on the market. In its early cases, the ECJ accepted that the 
provisions of the Treaties on competition law, namely arts 101 and 102, 
could be invoked to prevent the exercise of intellectual property rights 
(hereinafter: IPR) but only when that exercise amounted to behaviour 
prohibited by those articles.6 The author will show that the criteria for im-
posing limitations on the exercise of IPR by holders are not precise eno-
ugh, or possibly not even appropriate, leading to legal uncertainty, and 
having far-reaching consequences on the exercise of IPR and the system 
of intellectual property in general. Although there are a certain number 
of cases dealing with limitations of the exercise of IPR, the author will 
mainly discuss the Microsoft case before the European Commission and 
the Court of First Instance, which has recently raised much controversy. 
2 Consolidated version of 30 March 2010 OJ C83/47. 
3 18 December 2000 OJ C364/8; 30 March 2010 OJ C 83/389.
4 Treaty on European Union, Consolidated version of 30 March 2010 OJ C83/13.
5 Art 6 TEU.
6 See Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299; 
[1966] CMLR 418; Case 24/67 Parke, Davis v Centrafarm [1968] ECR 55. 
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2. Theoretical background
2.1. Intellectual property
Intellectual property is often referred to as new products of human 
intellectual endeavour. Intellectual property contributes to human (pu-
blic) knowledge, so there is strong public interest in intellectual creations 
being disclosed to the public. In order to encourage the disclosure of 
intellectual creations, intellectual property rights have been granted to 
inventors (creators) and the IPR system established.7 Intellectual proper-
ty rights do not only represent incentives for the disclosure of creations, 
but also for further innovation. Thus, IPRs reconcile private (moral and 
economic) and public (economic and social) interests – the interests of the 
individual in retaining his investment and being rewarded for his effort, 
and the interests of society in economic, technological and/or cultural 
development. 
Intellectual property rights are negative rights – they give their hol-
ders exclusive rights to use and to exclude everyone else from using their 
creations. Although this exclusive right (IPR) does not (necessarily) give 
its holder a monopoly on power, the exercise of IPR, by its nature, can 
create barriers to free trade. This is confirmed by TFEU in art 36 (ex art 30 
EC), in which it is stated that quantitative restrictions between Member 
States shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports 
or goods in transit justified on the grounds of (among other things) pro-
tection of industrial and commercial property. Although this provision 
may seem to contradict art 345 TFEU (ex art 295 EC) which lays down 
that the Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States 
governing the system of property ownership, this is not the case. In fact, 
ECJ (now CJEU) case law has offered an explanation by differentiating 
between the existence and the exercise of IPR.8 The existence of IPR may 
not be incompatible with the provisions of the TFEU on free movement of 
goods, although the exercise of the IPR may be.
In this sense, the exercise of IPRs may come into conflict with the 
provisions of TFEU setting up rules on competition. As already mentio-
ned, competition law helps to create and maintain a free internal market, 
while intellectual property may create barriers to entry to the market 
or lead to a dominant position on the part of a right-holder. Neverthele-
ss, competition and IPR do not appear to be fundamentally in conflict. 
7 IPR systems have been established at the national level. For the purposes of the internal 
market, IPR systems of the Member States are being harmonised, and even one IPR has 
been created at the Community level, namely the Community trademark.
8 See, for example, Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] 
ECR 299; Case C-78/70 Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v Metro SB Grossmarkte GmbH & Co 
[1971] ECR 487. 
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Rather, they are directed towards the same goals: consumer welfare and 
research and development. To this end, what is required is a balance that 
seeks to ensure sufficient rewards for the innovator to disclose his in-
vention, while at the same time preserving the competitive, open internal 
market, providing the best quality products at the lowest prices.9  
2.2. Abuse of dominant position
Exercising IPR by a dominant undertaking can sometimes amount 
to an abuse of dominant position. There is no comprehensive definition 
of ‘abuse of dominant position’, although the TFEU, in its rather broad 
wording, lists in art 102 examples of such abuse, which even so does 
not constitute an exhaustive list of abusive conduct. Nevertheless, art 
102 TFEU does not prohibit dominant undertakings from being able to 
compete ‘on merit’ nor is it in itself illegal for an undertaking to be in a 
dominant position. 
3. The Microsoft saga
 
In 1998, Sun Microsystems Inc, an undertaking based in Paolo Alto, 
California, USA, lodged a complaint with the European Commission sta-
ting that Microsoft, holding a dominant position as a supplier of PC ope-
rating systems, had refused to disclose to Sun and to others who provi-
ded server operating systems sufficient interface information necessary 
to create work group operating systems that would operate fully with 
Microsoft’s PC operating systems.10
Five years later, the European Commission found that Microsoft had 
abused its dominant position by refusing to supply interoperability infor-
mation and allow its use for the purpose of developing and distributing 
work group server operating system products. The European Commissi-
on also found that Microsoft had abused its dominant position by making 
the availability of the Windows Client PC Operating System conditional on 
the simultaneous acquisition of Windows Media Player (tying). Microsoft 
9 On the relationship between IP and competition law, see for example: Mark A Lemley, 
‘A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust’ (2007) 13 (2) Southwestern Journal of Law and 
Trade in Americas 237-256; Estelle Derclaye, ‘Abuses of Dominant Position and Intellectu-
al Property Rights: A Suggestion to Reconcile the Community Courts Case Law’ (2003) 
26 World Competition, 685-705; John Temple Lang, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual 
Property in European Community Antitrust Law’ (May 2002) <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/
intellect/020522langdoc.pdf> accessed on 10 August 2010.    
10 More specifically, the case concerned Microsoft’s ‘Windows 2000’ generation of PC and 
work group server operating systems.
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was fined €497,196,304, a sum which eventually grew to €1.396 billion 
due to Microsoft’s failure to comply with the Commission’s decision. In 
the first part of this article, the author will discuss the refusal to supply 
the interoperability information, while in the second part the author will 
turn to the tying issue in the Microsoft case.
3.1. Refusal to supply interoperability information 
In the Microsoft case11 concerning interoperability issues, the Eu-
ropean Commission found that Microsoft held the dominant position in 
two markets: PC operating systems and work group operating systems. 
The Commission found that the reason for Microsoft’s refusal to relea-
se interoperability information was in order to provide leverage for the 
dominant position it held on the operating system market and the work 
group server market. In fact, on the client PC operating systems market, 
Microsoft’s share of the market in 2000 was more than 90%.12 
In brief, PC operating systems13 are system software that control the 
basic functions of computers and enable users to use such computers 
and run application software on them. However, this case focused on 
‘work group server services’, which are the basic infrastructure services 
used by office workers in their day-to-day work, namely sharing files 
stored on servers, sharing printers, and the ‘administration’ of how users 
and groups of users can access these services and other services of the 
network.14 Work group server operating systems are operating systems 
designed and marketed to deliver these services collectively to relatively 
small numbers of client PCs linked together in small to medium-sized 
networks.15 In addition, work group operating systems can be used to 
run applications. 
In the European Union, a computer program is protected by 
copyright,16 giving its holder exclusive rights, such as the right to repro-
duction, adaptation and distribution of a computer program. Therefore, 
anyone who wants to use a computer program must have the authorisa-
tion of the right-holder. However, art 6 of the Software Directive allows 
for the decompilation of a computer program (i.e. reverse-engineering) 
without needing the authorisation of the right-holder, if the reproduction 
11 Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft [2005] 4 CMLR 965.
12 Microsoft  (n 11) recital 431.
13 Microsoft (n 11) recital 39: ‘... the operating system is often described as ‘platform softwa-
re’...or ‘platform’...
14 Microsoft (n 11) recital 53.
15 Microsoft (n 11).
16 Art 1 of Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs (Codified version) [2009] OJ L111, 
5.5.2009, 16-22 (hereinafter: the Software Directive).
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of the code and translation of its form are indispensable to obtain the 
information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently 
created computer program with other programs, if certain conditions are 
met.17 
According to the Commission, refusing to supply competitors with 
information that would enable them to develop competing programs for 
workgroup servers compatible with the Windows platform (ie interope-
rability information) amounted to an abuse of dominant position. The 
Commission found that Microsoft had actually been disclosing the in-
teroperability information to the providers of work group servers until it 
issued the Windows 2000 version. The Commission held that:
Non-dominant players in the work group server operating system 
market have incentives to provide their competitors with interopera-
bility information, since the existence of interoperable and comple-
mentary software products enhances the value of their own products 
in the eyes of users. […] It must also be pointed out that Microsoft 
itself acted in accordance with this logic when its position in the work 
group server operating system market was still marginal. Microsoft 
even disclosed source code in order to promote its programming mo-
dels and communication standards.18 
Over the years, the Windows platform became a de facto standard, which 
made it onerous for competitors to compete with Microsoft without the ne-
cessary interoperability information.19 This situation pushed Microsoft’s 
competitors (like Sun, Novell and IBM) to the margins of the market, 
which reduced their incentives to innovate and at the same time set up 
barriers to entry to the market. The Commission assessed that server-to-
server interoperability was indispensable input for Microsoft’s competi-
tors to compete in the work group server operating system market20 and 
concluded that Microsoft’s behaviour had impaired the effective competi-
tive structure in the market.21  Furthermore, since Microsoft’s behaviour 
led to the marginalisation of its competitors and the erection of barriers 
to entry to the operating systems market, the Commission’s opinion was 
that consumers had been deprived of choice.22 
The Commission followed the ECJ’s conclusion in previous case law 
that there was no obligation on the part of a dominant undertaking to 
17 Software Directive (n 16).  See points (a), (b) and (c) of art 6(1).
18 Microsoft (n 11) recitals 732 & 734.
19Microsoft (n 11) recital 637: ‘...interoperability with the Windows environment has played a 
key role in driving the uptake of Microsoft’s work group server operating systems’.
20 Microsoft (n 11) recital 692.
21 Microsoft (n 11) recital 704.
22 Microsoft (n 11) recital 706.
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supply or grant a licence, except under exceptional circumstances. In 
its decision, the Commission considered several judgments on refusal to 
supply, namely Commercial Solvents, Télémarketing, Tiercé Ladbroke,23 
but mainly on Magill24 and Bronner,25 and the test(s)26 set up by the ECJ 
in those cases: (i) supply of input is indispensable for continuing busi-
ness27 (or in the Magill case – refusal prevents the appearance of a new 
product for which there was potential consumer demand); (ii) refusal is 
likely to eliminate all the competition; and (iii) refusal is not objectively 
justified. However, in Microsoft, the Commission based its decision not 
only on these exceptional circumstances, but it also found other excepti-
onal circumstances that led to the conclusion that Microsoft’s behaviour 
amounted to the abuse of dominant position.28   
In response, Microsoft claimed that the information requested by 
Sun did not concern interfaces and therefore its request did not relate to 
interoperability; that it had already made certain disclosures that would 
facilitate interoperability between competing work group server operating 
systems and the Windows environment; that the needed information co-
uld have been obtained by way of reverse-engineering; that the Commi-
ssion lacked evidence that Microsoft’s actions had harmed consumers; 
that refusal to supply was objectively justified due to intellectual property 
rights over the information requested; that Sun required a degree of inte-
roperability that was too high and went beyond the ‘full interoperability’ 
that would be contemplated by the Software Directive and finally, that it 
had no incentive to foreclose competitors.29 
The Commission rejected all the arguments and held that all requi-
rements to establish the abuse of dominant position had been met. The 
Commission’s finding of abuse was upheld on appeal to the Court of First 
Instance30 (hereinafter: CFI) in Microsoft vs Commission.31
23 Joined Cases 6 & 7-73 Commercial Solvents and Others v Commission [1974] ECR 223; 
Case 311/84 Télémarketing v CLT and IPB [1985] ECR 3261; Case T-504/93 Tiercé Ladbro-
ke v Commission [1997] ECR II-923.
24 Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P RTE and ITP v Commission [1995] ECR I-743.
25 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791.
26 Those tests are similar but slightly different, see Magill paras 52-56, and Bronner para 
41.
27 The supply is indispensable - meaning that there is no realistic actual or potential sub-
stitute; see Bronner (n 25) para 41.
28 Generally about other circumstances, see also recital 557; Microsoft’s refusal to supply 
limits technical development to the prejudice of consumers (recital 701); the specifics of a 
particular industry (recital 470); disclosure of interoperability information is not exceptio-
nal in the industry (recital 730); leveraging strategy (recitals 769-778), etc.
29 Microsoft (n 11) recitals 208, 292, 702, 709, 731, 730, 764.
30 Now the General Court, after the Lisbon Treaty came into force.
31 Case T-201/04 [2007] ECR II-000.
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In its judgment, the CFI also analysed the relevant case law, par-
ticularly Magill, Bronner and IMS Health,32 a case that was decided by the 
ECJ shortly after the Commission brought the decision in the Microsoft 
case. The CFI repeated that the mere refusal by a dominant undertaking 
to license a product covered by IPR could not in itself constitute abuse 
of dominant position. However, only in exceptional circumstances would 
the exercise of an exclusive right by the owner of the intellectual property 
right give rise to such an abuse.33 The Court indicated the following cir-
cumstances, in particular,34 which must be considered to be exceptional: 
(i) refusal relates to products or services indispensable to the exercise of a 
particular activity on a neighbouring market; (ii) refusal is of such a kind 
as to exclude any effective competition on that neighbouring market; (iii) 
refusal prevents the appearance of a new product for which there is po-
tential consumer demand.35 Of course, if these circumstances are met, 
the behaviour (refusal to supply) may constitute an infringement of art 82 
EC (now art 102 TFEU), unless it is objectively justified. 
At this point, it should be noted that neither the Commission nor the 
CFI drew any conclusions as to whether Microsoft’s interoperability infor-
mation was indeed protected by IPR or not; the Commission, as well as 
the CFI, only assumed that it was. Therefore, they applied the test for the 
refusal to supply to third parties a licence relating to intellectual proper-
ty rights, which they claimed was the most favourable to Microsoft, and 
concluded that the strict criteria against which such a refusal may be 
found to constitute an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning 
of art 82 EC (now 102 TFEU) were anyway satisfied in the present case. 
3.1.1. Analysis of the test applied
Concerning the indispensability requirement, the author will not 
hypothesise as to whether the requested information was indispensable 
for Sun to create work group server operating systems that would work 
with the Windows environment; for the purpose of this article, it will be 
assumed that it was. It should merely be pointed out that the Commi-
ssion and the CFI regarded the indispensability requirement as close-
ly connected with economic viability.36 Vesterdorf, the President of the 
32 Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] ECR 
I-05039.  
33 Case T-201/04 (n 31) para 331.
34 Indicating that these circumstances did not represent an exhaustive list of circumstances.
35 Case T-201/04 (n 31) para 332.
36 Case T-201/04 (n 31) para 352: ‘The indispensability criterion entails an examination 
of the degree of interoperability necessary to remain as a viable competitor on the market 
and of whether the withheld information is the only economically viable source for achieving 
that degree of interoperability.’ 
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Grand Chamber in the CFI’s Microsoft case, indicates in his article37 that, 
with this broadened notion of indispensability, the Commission would be 
able to apply a wide margin of appreciation to the question of whether or 
not access to a licence of an IPR is ‘economically indispensable’. 
This probably makes it easier to find a refusal on the part of a do-
minant undertaking abusive and may leave such an undertaking 
– when it is the holder of an IPR – with less legal certainty as and 
under which circumstances it will have to grant a licence in order to 
avoid being caught by the net of Article 82 EC. […] From a criteri-
on based on objective, almost physical indispensability – as we also 
know it from the concept of ‘essential facilities’ – it has been broade-
ned to include an economic assessment.38 
‘Economically viable’ obviously means that a competitor must not be 
pushed to the margins of the market; otherwise it would not put competi-
tive pressure on a dominant undertaking. However, the term ‘economical 
viability’ is very broad and can lead to the danger of protecting compe-
titors rather than competition as such. If an economic assessment is 
included in deciding whether or not input is indispensable - whether the 
refusal to supply is abusive - then at least some parameters as to what 
would amount to ‘economic viability’ are indispensable. However, even 
with parameters, an economic assessment would have to be carried out 
on a case-by-case basis, and every time an undertaking required from 
the dominant undertaking the alleged indispensable input (concerning 
its IPR), the dominant undertaking would have to perform the economic 
analysis. The author believes this would be too heavy a burden for the 
IPR holders with a dominant position on the market. Therefore, this requ-
irement, especially broadened after the CFI decision, would hardly func-
tion in practice and the situation after this decision would create great 
legal uncertainty. However, the question of economic viability in relation 
to the indispensability requirement leads us to the second requirement 
of the test applied.   
As the Court stated, refusal is abusive if it is of such a kind as to 
exclude any effective competition. The question is what is meant by 
the notion of ‘effective competition’? How many undertakings/competi-
tors must be on the market in order to have effective competition? Are 
two enough? Three? More? Although there is no (uniform) explanation, in 
theory or practice, of what effective competition is, it can be agreed that 
a quasi monopoly situation on the market would not usually represent 
a state of effective competition. For example, Vesterdorf indicates that 
37 Bo Vesterdorf, ‘Article 82 EC: Where do we stand after the Microsoft judgement?’ (25 
June 2008) 7 http://www.icc.qmul.ac.uk/GAR/Vesterdorf.pdf accessed 10 August 2010.
38 Vesterdorf (n 37) 7. 
112 Irena Tušek: EU Competition Law Policy versus Intellectual Property Rights...
effective competition would mean competition which might represent a 
real constraint or a real competitive challenge to the dominant underta-
king.39 Further, Dolmans, O’Donoghue and Loewenthal consider effective 
competition to be: 
a meaningful process of competition whereby firms have an effective 
opportunity to compete on the merits on the basis of price, quality, 
and innovation. […] Competitors that are marginalized in dynamic 
markets and that are unable – or deprived of further incentives – to 
engage in viable competitive innovation are effectively the same as 
no competition in those areas.40 
On the other hand, Bishop and Walker define effective competition in 
relation to the outcome that the market produces: 
What matters therefore are the outcomes for consumers that com-
petition in a particular market delivers - not the particular form that 
the competition process takes. Whether a market is characterized 
by effective competition or not therefore depends on the outcomes it 
produces.41 
Therefore, it is questionable whether this requirement for the exclusion 
of effective competition is justified to limit intellectual property rights 
(exclusive rights) acquired by law at all: if IPR can be limited only in 
exceptional circumstances, how can a compulsory licensing obligation 
be imposed on a dominant undertaking, limiting its IPR, if the notion 
of effective competition, as an exceptional circumstance, has not been 
defined?  
However, the requirement that perhaps raises the most controversy 
and will be dealt with in more detail in this article is the ‘new product’ 
requirement. This requirement is particularly interesting, especially from 
the point of view of intellectual property law.42 What is actually meant 
by a new product? The term ‘new product’ resembles the term ‘novel’ 
or ‘novelty’ in patent law.43 Thus, if we use patent law terminology, a 
39 Vesterdorf (n 37) 8.
40 Maurits Dolmans, Robert O’Donoghue and Paul-John Loewenthal, ‘Article 82 EC and In-
tellectual Property: The State of the Law Pending the Judgement in Microsoft v Commission’ 
(2007) 3 (1) Competition Policy International 130.
41 Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law (2nd edn Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 2002) para 2.10.
42 In cases involving an IPR, the Courts (CFI and/or ECJ) employed the new product test 
while assessing whether a refusal to supply amounted to an abuse of dominant position. In 
that respect, see Magill and IMS Health (n 24 and 32). 
43 Art 52 (1) of the European Patent Convention (a revised version of EPC entered into force 
on 13 December 2007): ‘European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are 
susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step 
[emphasis added]. See also Article 27 (1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights. 
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new product would be a product that does not form part of the state of 
the art,44 ie that did not exist before (or at least was not revealed to the 
public). Thus, would this mean that a new product is a product that in-
cludes at least one new technical feature which distinguishes it from the 
state of the art? Is there a quality scale for such a technical feature or 
would it suffice for a new product to have merely a new feature,  which 
would not make it differ significantly from an already existing product, 
in other words, not substantially change the product itself, or its usage? 
Would this be enough to force the right-holder to license their intellectual 
property right? Would this amount to an exceptional circumstance? The 
Court analysed this further and added that this requirement did not refer 
only to a new product but also to a technical development.45 Neverthe-
less, all the above could also be applied to technical development. So, 
what would amount to technical development? Would it entail the normal 
progress of technology, an obvious advancement from the point of view of 
a person skilled in the art (ie an expert)? Or would it demand an inven-
tive step, ie a technical development not so obvious to a person skilled 
in the art, as under patent law? If the new product test was assessed ac-
cording to patent law, it would be questionable whether the Commission 
(or the NCAs) or the Court were skilled to judge it from the point of view 
of patent law. One may argue that the new product requirement should 
not be appraised according to such strict criteria, that less demanding 
criteria should be applied for compulsory licensing, meaning that the 
new product requirement does not have to be ‘a new patent’ requirement. 
Regardless of whether this presumption is true or false, the new product 
test as it exists and is applied at the moment is not precise, leaving a very 
wide margin of discretion that leads to a great deal of legal uncertainty 
for dominant undertakings who are IPR holders. Therefore, at least some 
guidelines are needed for the assessment of what constitutes a new prod-
uct or technical development. Of course, the test would need to be differ-
ent, depending on the kind of industry involved, or the kind of intellectual 
property right involved in a particular case. Since this case dealt with 
software, perhaps the new product (or technical development) require-
ment should have been assessed from the point of view of copyright law 
(since computer programs are at last protected by copyright).          
Therefore, if we analyse the concept of a new product or a technical 
development (in this particular case) through copyright law, for a product 
to be new or considered as containing a technical development, it must 
only be original in the sense that the product (ie a computer program) 
44 European Patent Convention (n 43) art 54 (1).
45 Case T-201/04 (n 31) para 647.
114 Irena Tušek: EU Competition Law Policy versus Intellectual Property Rights...
is the author’s own intellectual creation.46 But what about the level of 
originality, if it exists? In Recital 8 of the Software Directive it is explicitly 
stated that in determining whether or not a computer program is an origi-
nal work, no tests as to the qualitative or aesthetic merits of the program 
should be applied.47 This would mean that a new product should not 
be appraised from the point of view of quality, but rather as someone’s 
intellectual creation. In that sense, it seems that the notion of a new 
product is a fairly broad one and leaves a certain margin for interpreta-
tion, especially in a sophisticated industry like the software industry. It 
would also seem that, in this specific case, a new product would be any 
product which did not represent literally a copy of Microsoft’s operat-
ing system. The European Commission stated that ‘cloning’ Microsoft’s 
operating systems could be considered only if Sun were allowed access 
to Microsoft’s source code, not just the duplication of functionalities.48 
Thus, one may conclude that a new product (a new computer program) 
does not need to offer anything new to the state of the art in the sense 
of its functionalities; it suffices that its author develops a computer pro-
gram (with the same technical features) independently, without using the 
source code of another computer program developed by other(s). Even 
though the term ‘new product’ is additionally defined with the rider ‘for 
which there is potential consumer demand’, this is a sweeping phrase. In 
fact, the question is whether it is the role of the European Commission or 
the CFI to decide for which product there is potential consumer demand 
and for which there is none. In Magill or IMS Health it was quite easy 
to perceive that there was potential consumer demand for the products 
in question. However, this is not always so clear. In fact, from what we 
have noted so far, it may be concluded that the requirement for a new 
product or a technical development, from the point of view of copyright 
law, is relatively easy to fulfil. This would mean that the circumstance 
was not so exceptional, which in the end might result in (unjustifiably) 
coercing the right-holder to license their intellectual property right eas-
ily and often. Thus, an exclusive right to exclude others from using the 
creation protected by intellectual property right(s) would no longer be 
exclusive. This broad, vague requirement of a new product or technical 
development might therefore undermine the concept and even the ratio 
of intellectual property rights. Lévêque notes that neither the economic, 
nor the legal definition of newness helps to determine whether the refusal 
to license is abusive to the detriment of consumers, and adds that the 
46 Software Directive (n 16) art 1 (3).
47 See more on the notion of originality of a computer program and its different interpre-
tations: Alain Strowel & Estelle Derclaye, Droit d’auteur et numérique: logiciels, bases de 
données, multimédia (Bruylant, Brussels 2001) 185-191.
48 Microsoft (n 11) recitals 713-728.
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new product condition is difficult to apply, since newness is a continuous 
rather than a discrete variable.49 
3.1.2. Consumer harm
As already mentioned, the existence of intellectual property is impor-
tant in order to encourage invention and the contribution of such inventi-
ons to human knowledge. If authors/inventors have an incentive to inno-
vate and reveal their innovation to the public, society will advance. Thus, 
innovation enhances consumer welfare. If innovation is stifled, prosperity 
will not increase, and this will be to the detriment of consumers. In that 
respect, it is highly important to apply well-founded and credible tests in 
order to find refusal to license IPR as abusive behaviour in the sense of 
art 102 TFEU. 
In this case, the Commission considered that Microsoft’s refusal to 
supply the relevant information was of limited technical developmental 
importance, to the prejudice of consumers within the meaning of art 
82(b) EC (now art 102(b) TFEU).50 Firstly, because of the lack of interope-
rability of competing work group server operating system products with 
the Windows environment, an increasing number of consumers were loc-
ked into a homogeneous Windows solution at the level of work group 
server operating systems. Secondly, Microsoft’s refusal discouraged its 
competitors from developing and marketing work group server operating 
systems with innovative features. In conclusion, consumers had been 
deprived of choice, which the Commission (and the CFI) equated with 
consumer  harm.51 Microsoft argued that the Commission had not pro-
ved any harm had been done to consumers, but this was rejected by the 
Commission; the inability to choose constituted in itself consumer harm 
– the inability to benefit from innovative products brought to the market 
by competitors. The Commission did not show any evidence as to how 
consumers might have suffered from the alleged loss, ie the lack of cho-
ice. Of course, it can be agreed that a lack of choice is not beneficial to 
consumers. Lévêque points out that: 
The value lost by consumers for the improved product not being on 
the market is the key variable. [...] From an economic perspective 
what is important is not whether some consumers would like the 
49 François Lévêque, ‘Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities: Interoperability Li-
censing in the EU Microsoft Case’,(March 2005) Cerna <http://www.cerna.ensmp.fr/Docu-
ments/Innovation,_leveraging_and_essential_facilities:_Interoperability_licensing_in_the_
EU_Microsoft_case.pdf> accessed 10 August 2010. Lévêque does not consider the product 
to be the relevant level of analysis; rather, he considers the analysis of incentive effects 
(incentives to innovate) to test whether the market will be limited to the prejudice of consu-
mers to be more relevant.  
50 Microsoft (n 11) recital 693 and onwards.
51 Microsoft (n 11) recital 694; Case T-201/04 (n 31) paras 649 – 653.
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improvement being made but what is their willingness to pay for and 
whether it outweighs the costs of improvement.52 53 
Moreover, when the Commission stated that in the case in question 
Microsoft caused consumer harm, was the Commission referring to ave-
rage or specialised consumers (IT experts)? It would be interesting to read 
the Commission’s or the Court’s findings in this respect, since one must 
admit that the needs and therefore the alleged loss of these two categories 
of consumers are not the same. 
Furthermore, when we talk of the reasons for restraining someone’s 
(exclusive) rights acquired by law and the conditions under which it is 
justifiable to restrain those rights, the reasons must be sound and the 
conditions strict and known in advance. As shown above, the test appli-
ed leaves a great deal of room for manoeuvre which eo ipso leads to legal 
uncertainty. An undertaking in a dominant position cannot be sure when 
it will be obliged to license its intellectual property, which may diminish 
its incentive to innovate. In addition, an undertaking may decide not to 
invest in innovation if it will be forced to license the product/result of 
its investments, because of the high possibility of other undertakings 
(competitors) getting a free ride. The absence of further innovation also 
represents prejudice towards consumers. However, in the present case, 
the Commission came to the conclusion that a detailed examination of 
the scope of the disclosure at stake led to the conclusion that, on ba-
lance, the possible negative impact of an order to supply on Microsoft’s 
incentives to innovate was outweighed by its positive impact on the level 
of innovation in the whole industry (including Microsoft).54 Spulber di-
sagrees by stating that competition policy that promotes competition for 
its own sake need not result in greater innovation, and emphasises that: 
Policies that place asymmetric burdens on firms that have larger 
market shares will reduce the incentive to innovate for both large 
and small firms. Deterrence of innovation may cause firms to seek 
other avenues of competition, from high-priced branding strategies 
to bargain-basement pricing strategies. At risk are the potential be-
nefits of new products, new technologies, and new transaction met-
hods. Consumers are harmed when competition policy diminishes 
the incentive to innovate. […] By reducing IP protections, Microsoft 
v. Commission reduced the incentive to innovate both for successful 
firms and for their competitors.55 
52 Lévêque (n 49) 8.
53 As already mentioned above, a new product, if regarded from the copyright law point of 
view, does not need to involve improvement(s), it just needs to be original in the sense of art 
1 (3) of the Software Directive.
54 Microsoft (n 11) recital 783.
55 Daniel F Spulber, ‘Competition Policy and the Incentive to Innovate: The Dynamic Effects 
of Microsoft v. Commission’ (2008) 25 (2) Yale Journal on Regulation 247-301, 300, 301.
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Finally, it should be noted that in its decision, the Commission 
highlighted the essential objective of IPR, by stating in recital 711 that: 
The central function of intellectual property rights is to protect the 
moral rights in a right-holder’s work and ensure a reward for the 
creative effort. But it is also an essential objective of intellectual pro-
perty law that creativity should be stimulated for the general public 
good. A refusal by an undertaking to grant a licence may, under 
exceptional circumstances, be contrary to the general public good by 
constituting an abuse of a dominant position with harmful effects on 
innovation and on consumers. 
The Commission ordered Microsoft to make interoperability information 
available on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, to allow the use 
of the interoperability information and to keep the information updated.56 
Thus, in the end, Microsoft had to license its interoperability informa-
tion in order to stimulate creativity and foster the general public good. 
However, whether this decision will generate general public good or only 
protect competitors in the short term, the future will tell.    
3.2. Tying
Besides the refusal to supply interoperability information, the Com-
mission found that Microsoft had also abused its dominant position by 
tying its Windows Media Player to its PC operating system, ie by selling 
its PC operating system with a streaming media player57 already built in 
(pre-installed).
Tying is the practice whereby the supplier of one product, the tying 
product, requires a buyer to buy a second product too, the tied product.58 
Art 102(d) TFEU lists tying as an example of abuse, ‘making the conclu-
sion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supple-
mentary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.’ Tying is 
a common business strategy, because it is a way of reducing costs, im-
proving quality, and reducing price inefficiency, but it is also a strategy 
to foreclose markets, exclude competitors from the market or push them 
to the margins, or conceal prices. There has been little case law on tying, 
56 Microsoft (n 11) art 5(a)(b).
57 Microsoft (n 11) recital 401,’Media players are client-side software applications, the core 
functionality of which is to decode, decompress and play (and further allow to process) di-
gital audio and video files downloaded or streamed over the Internet (and other networks). 
Media players are also capable of playing back audio and video files stored on physical 
carriers such as CDs and DVDs. As with other application software, a media player consists 
of a Graphical User Interface and the underlying technology, that is to say, the software 
code, which enables multimedia playback functionality.’
58 Whish (n 1) 18. 
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and in that sense, the Microsoft case represents a huge step forward in 
dealing with this type of abuse. In the two leading cases from previous 
case law, Hilti59 and Tetra Pak II,60 the Commission, the CFI (now General 
Court) and the ECJ (now the Court of Justice of the European Union) 
decided that tying was illegal per se for undertakings holding a domi-
nant position on the tying product market. In Hilti, the Commission held 
that Hilti had abused its dominant position on the market for equipment 
for inserting fastenings used in the construction industries by requiring 
purchasers of its nail gun to acquire cartridges (protected by IPR) and na-
ils. The Commission concluded that Hilti tried to leverage its dominance 
from one product market to another two product markets (consumables). 
In Tetra Pak II, the Commission held that Tetra Pak had abused its do-
minant position on the market for (non-)aseptic machines by tying the 
supply of those machines to the supply of Tetra Pak cartons which the 
machines filled.     
In the Microsoft case, Microsoft was selling its PC operating system 
with its Media Player pre-installed,61 denying customers the opportunity of 
buying the Microsoft PC operating system without Windows Media Player 
(WMP). The Commission applied the test, set out in previous case law, un-
der which the tying arrangement is contrary to art 82 EC (now 102 TFEU): 
(i) the tying and tied goods are two separate products; (ii) the undertaking 
concerned is dominant on the tying product market; (iii) the undertaking 
concerned does not give customers the choice of obtaining the tying pro-
duct without the tied product; and (iv) tying forecloses competition.62 
As for the first requirement, the Commission decided that WMP and 
Windows represented two distinct products, since there was an inde-
pendent consumer demand for the tied product (WMP). As evidence, the 
Commission accepted the fact that the market provided media players 
separately, that there were vendors developing and supplying media 
players on a stand-alone basis, separate from PC operating systems, and 
that Microsoft itself sold versions of its WMP separately from its OS, for 
example to Apple Mac operating systems and to the Sun Solaris client 
operating system, and finally, that Microsoft had carried out promotional 
activity specially dedicated to WMP. The Commission rejected Microsoft’s 
argument that WMP was an integral part of Windows, ie that there was 
only one integrated product.
59 Case T-30/89 Hilti AG v EC Commission [1991] ECR II-1439; and C-53/92 P Hilti AG v 
EC Commission [1994] ECR I-667. 
60 Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak v Commission [1994] ECR II-755; Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak v 
Commission [1996] ECR I-5951. 
61 Microsoft (n 11) recital 310: ‘Windows Media Player is installed on the computer as a 
non-removable component of Windows.’
62 Microsoft (n 11) recital 794.
119CYELP 6 [2010] 103-126
Further, the Commission found that Microsoft had a dominant po-
sition on the PC operating system market and that it tried to leverage 
its dominant position onto the streaming media player market by dis-
tributing Windows (the tying product) only with WMP (the tied product), 
without providing the means for removing WMP.63 Therefore, according to 
the Commission, the second requirement was also satisfied.     
Third, the Commission ascertained that original equipment manu-
facturers (OEM) were forced, by virtue of Microsoft’s licensing model, to 
license Windows only with WMP pre-installed. If an OEM wished to install 
another media player, this could only be done by installing an additio-
nal media player alongside WMP rather than instead of WMP. Microsoft 
argued that WMP was distributed with Windows at no extra charge and 
that users were not obliged to use it; on the contrary, they were free to 
use any other media player, most of which were available free of charge. 
The Commission rejected this argument by stating that it was immate-
rial that consumers were not forced to purchase or use WMP - as long 
as consumers automatically obtained WMP (even if free of charge), the 
alternative suppliers were at a competitive disadvantage.64 
Lastly, concerning the foreclosure of competition on the market for 
media players, the Commission went one step further. According to pre-
vious case law, it was enough to establish the existence of the first three 
elements, while the foreclosure element was (almost) presumed. The 
same was true of objective justification – it could be raised but it would 
not have much influence on the outcome of the case: 
Tying under EC law therefore seems to be closer to a strong per se 
rule of illegality: a dominant firm commits an abuse if it requires 
from consumers to take another product as a condition of taking 
its dominant product and is commercially successful at tying the 
products.65  
This represents the form-based approach to tying. In the Microsoft case, 
the Commission moved from the form-based approach to an effects-ba-
sed approach by examining in detail the effects that tying had on compe-
tition, since it admitted that there were some pro-competitive elements in 
the impugned tying.66 
63 Microsoft (n 11) recital 799.
64 Microsoft (n 11) recitals 826-834.
65 Christian Ahlborn and David Evans, ‘The Microsoft Judgment and its Implications for 
Competition Policy Towards Dominant Firms in Europe’ (2009) 75 (3) Antitrust Law Journal 
887-932 <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=39753559&s
ite=ehost-live> accessed 10 August 2010.
66 Microsoft (n 11) recital 841.
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Despite certain pro-competitive elements in the tying in question 
(the media player provided free of charge; users can and do to a certain 
extent obtain third party media players through the Internet, sometimes 
also free of charge), the Commission ascertained that the maintenance 
of an effective competition structure in the media player market was put 
at risk. Because of the ubiquity of the Windows platform, and therefore 
the ubiquity of WMP, the content and application providers choose to 
make their products compatible with the most popular (distributed) me-
dia player, thus stifling competition among producers of streaming media 
players (the network effects67 of ubiquity). The Commission was of the 
opinion that tying would entail foreclosure of competition, due to the fact 
that complementary content and applications were liable to be developed 
primarily for WMP.68 Furthermore, the Commission decided that no other 
distribution mechanism or combination of distribution mechanisms had 
attained this level of universal distribution (not even by downloading 
from the Internet). The Commission concluded:
There is therefore a reasonable likelihood that tying WMP with Win-
dows will lead to a lessening of competition so that the maintenance 
of an effective competition structure will not be ensured in the fore-
seeable future. For these reasons, tying WMP with Windows violates 
the prohibition to abuse a dominant position enshrined in Article 
82 of the Treaty and in particular point (d) of the second paragraph 
thereof.69 
Finally, the Commission ordered Microsoft to offer, beside the bundled 
version of Windows, a fully-functioning version of the Windows Client PC 
Operating System which did not incorporate WMP.70 However, Microsoft 
would not be obliged to offer the unbundled version of Windows (Win-
dows N) at a lower price.  
The Commission’s finding of abuse in this respect was upheld on 
appeal to the CFI. The Court emphasised that the four above-mentioned 
conditions for establishing whether tying was abusive coincided effecti-
vely with the conditions laid down in art 82(d) EC (now art 102(d) TFEU). 
In addition, the Court found the Commission had not erred in examining 
in more detail the possible foreclosure effects of Microsoft’s practice.71
67 Network effects arise where the value of a product increases with the number of custo-
mers who use the same product, but also with an increase in the number and variety of 
complementary products. This is a very common occurrence on the telecommunications 
and software markets.
68 Microsoft (n 11) recital 863.
69 Microsoft (n 11) recital 984.
70 Microsoft (n 11) art 6 of the Decision.
71 Case T-201/04 (n 31) paras 1036-1090. Although the Court emphasised in para 1035 
that ‘...the fact that the Commission examined the actual effects which the bundling had 
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3.2.1. Analysis of the test applied
3.2.1.1. The separate product test
Microsoft argued that Windows and WMP constituted one integrated 
product and that there was no consumer demand for the PC operating 
system without WMP. The Court admitted that the IT and communica-
tions industry was an industry in constant and rapid evolution, so that 
what initially appeared to be separate products might subsequently be 
regarded as forming a single product, both from the technological aspect 
and from the aspect of competition rules.72 However, the Court added 
that it was by reference to the factual and technical situation that existed 
at the time when, according to the Commission, the impugned conduct 
had become harmful, ie the period after May 1999, that the Court must 
assess whether the Commission was correct in finding that streaming 
media players and client PC operating systems constituted two separate 
products.73 
At this point, it must be noted that the Commission, according to 
the Court, correctly examined this criterion in relation to (separate) con-
sumer demand. Interestingly enough, the Commission indicated that the 
fact that a not insignificant number of consumers chose to obtain me-
dia players separately from their operating system showed that informed 
consumers recognised them as separate products.74 The Court, althou-
gh it confirmed the Commission’s finding about two separate products, 
did not use the term ‘informed consumers’, nor did it differentiate users 
according to their IT skills. Furthermore, the Commission also took into 
account (recital 866) ‘sophisticated users’ when explaining the differences 
in the burden of downloading a media player of different users. Microsoft 
also used in its argumentation the distinction between users in arguing 
that ‘home users who know little about computers’ favour buying systems 
that can be plugged in and run with a minimum of effort.75 The Com-
mission did not discuss this distinction any further; it used the term 
‘consumers’ throughout the whole decision, and only in recital 806 did it 
use the term ‘informed consumers’. The Commission did not define the 
already had on the market and the way in which that market was likely to evolve, rather 
than merely considering – as it normally does in cases of abusive tying – that the tying 
has by its nature a foreclosure effect, does not mean that it adopted a new legal theory.’ 
Can it be understood that the Court’s opinion was that, despite the Commission’s detailed 
analysis of the actual effects of tying on the market, it was and still is sufficient to find a 
tying conduct – which has by its nature (automatically) a foreclosure effect? Ahlborn and 
Evans (see n 65) are of the opinion that it is so, while Larouche disagrees (see n 78).      
72 Case T-201/04 (n 31) para 913.
73 Case T-201/04 (n 31) para 914.
74 Microsoft (n 11) recital 806.
75 Microsoft (n 11) recital 846.
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term ‘informed user’, but it could be concluded that an informed consu-
mer would know more about computers than a consumer.76 From this, it 
may be speculated (in the absence of empirical evidence) that from the 
point of view of users less skilled in IT, the operating system (Windows) 
and WMP could have been viewed as a single product even at that time, 
May 1999 and onwards (as the Court referred to that period). Contrary to 
‘uninformed users’ or ‘unsophisticated users’ or ‘home users who know 
little about computers’, informed (or sophisticated) users might see them, 
as the Commission stated, as two separate products. Did the Commissi-
on take the higher level criterion to establish whether Windows and WMP 
represented one or two products? If so, why did it not continue to base its 
findings and conclusion at that level? If the Commission had continued 
to base its findings according to informed consumers, it would have taken 
into account that informed consumers could easily obtain (eg download) 
other streaming media players and that they could easily see the differen-
ce in quality between various players such as WMP and RealPlayer, Qu-
ickTime, etc, so that there would be no risk of market foreclosure. What 
did Commission mean by the term ‘informed consumer’? How informed 
would a person need to be to be included in that category? Why did the 
Commission assess such a crucial element in this test only according to 
the abilities of informed consumers? Why did the Commission not assess 
this element in terms of how an average consumer perceived it, as in tra-
demark law?77 It might be that by even at that time (May 1999), by taking 
into account average consumers, the Commission could have reached a 
different conclusion about the first element of the test – the product(s) 
element.78
76 Since the Commission did not define the notion of ‘sophisticated consumer’ either, it is 
questionable whether this category of consumer represents another (third) category of con-
sumers or the same category as the ‘informed consumer’. 
77 In trademark law, the institute of an average consumer is used as a criterion for asse-
ssing the distinctiveness of the proposed/used trade mark (sign). According to case law, 
the notion of average consumers means, in English, ‘... consumers who are reasonably well 
informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’; however, it is important to observe 
that in French this definition does not use the words ‘well informed’ but: ‘normalement 
informé [emphasis added] et raisonnablement attentif et avisé’; and in German, ‘eines dur-
chschnittlich informierten [emphasis added], aufmerksamen und verständigen Durchsch-
nittsverbrauchers’.. See cases: C-210/96 Gut Springenheide and Tusky / Oberkreisdirektor 
des Kreises Steinfurt [1998] ECR I-4657 para 31; C-53/01 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV 
v Remington Consumer Products Ltd [2002] ECR I-05475 para 63; Joined cases C-53/01 
Linde and others v Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt [2003] ECR I-03161 para 41. 
78 Pierre Larouche also distinguishes two classes of consumers: more tech-savvy consu-
mers and mainstream consumers, the former wanting the best available media player for 
their requirements, and being able and willing to undertake whatever operations might be 
necessary (including downloading a program, installing it, and configuring Windows) to 
obtain and use that media player, and the latter who, having neither the skills nor the will 
to play with the software on their computer, expect their computer system to be able to 
handle media files and will be satisfied with whichever media player or ‘media functionality’ 
handles that task. Larouche estimates (emphasising that this estimation does not involve 
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The question is whether the Commission should in similar cases 
take as a starting point for the assessment of two separate products the 
average consumer rather than a skilled one. There seem to be some lo-
gical arguments in favour of such a conclusion and one of them is le-
gal certainty. Even though this test (with average consumers taken into 
account) might not have yielded a different result in this particular case 
(although this does not seem to be the case), it may well be that in some 
other cases this requirement might turn out to be important, leading to 
a different outcome.
In this case, Microsoft argued that it was necessary to assess 
whether there was a meaningful consumer demand for the unbundled 
version of the tying product (for client operating systems without multi-
media functionality).79 As already mentioned, the Commission assessed 
whether there was an independent demand for an allegedly ‘tied’ pro-
duct80 and concluded that such a demand indeed existed. The CFI upheld 
the Commission’s finding in this respect and stated that:, 
as the Commission correctly observes in its pleadings, Microsoft’s 
argument, based on the concept that there is no demand for a Win-
dows client PC operating system without a streaming media player, 
amounts to contending that complementary products cannot con-
stitute separate products for the purposes of Article 82 EC, which is 
contrary to the Community case-law on bundling. To take Hilti, for 
example, it may be assumed that there was no demand for a nail gun 
magazine without nails, since a magazine without nails is useless.81 
Alhorn and Evans lay down that: 
this claim reveals a misunderstanding of Microsoft’s version of the 
separate product test. The test is not whether there is demand for the 
tying product (operating systems, nail guns) if the complementary 
product (media players, nails) does not exist. The test is whether, if 
given the choice, most customers would want to buy two products 
as a bundle from the same manufacturer, or whether a significant 
making an empirical claim) that the former class of consumers represents a non-negligible 
minority. ‘If that intuition is correct, then there is demand for the products separately from 
each other and the CFI rightly sided with the Commission.’ Pierre Larouche ‘The Europe-
an Microsoft Case at the Crossroads of Competition Policy and Innovation: Comment on 
Ahlborn and Evans’ (2009) 75 (3) Antitrust Law Journal 933-963 <http://search.ebsco-
host.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=39753560&site=ehost-live> accessed 10 
August 2010.  
79 Microsoft (n 11) recital 1024.
80 Microsoft (n 11) recital 803.
81 Hilti AG v EC Commission (n 59) para 921.
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share of customers would want to make separate purchase decisions 
for the two products.82 
3.2.1.2. Foreclosure of competition 
Notwithstanding the conclusion of the existence of two separate pro-
ducts – the question still remains as to whether tying would have fo-
reclosed the competition. Now, six years after the Commission’s decision 
that Microsoft should also offer Windows without WMP (called Windows 
N), the reality is that the demand for Windows N is insignificant83 and 
that competitive streaming media players still exist - like Real Player, 
Adobe Flash Player, QuickTime, VLC Media Player, Winamp, etc. There-
fore, the Commission’s conclusion that there was a reasonable likelihood 
that tying WMP with Windows would lead to a lessening of competition, 
so that inability to maintain an effective competition structure in the 
foreseeable future did not happen. Here again, the same question may 
be raised as in the previous argument on the interoperability issue: how 
many undertakings/competitors must be on the market in order to have 
effective competition or, in other words, what is effective competition? 
One can assume that eventually the number of media players will lessen 
and that only the best media players will survive – this is the possible 
outcome of competition on the relevant market, but having three or more 
media players on the market (as today) does not represent evidence that 
competition is not effective, nor that it has shrunk, with the risk of the 
market being foreclosed eventually.
Microsoft, the copyright holder of Windows, decided to upgrade its 
product with a media player. This was its right within the law – to exploit 
its creation. The Commission and the CFI restrained its right because of 
the dominant position it held on the PC operating system market. Howe-
ver, the reasons for limiting the exercise of intellectual property rights 
(even of a dominant undertaking) must be justified by some higher, 
common value(s), and the conditions (criteria) for limiting IPR must be 
explicit and known in advance. If not, intellectual property would not 
enjoy protection accorded by the law. Nor would the right-holder know 
how to behave – there would be no legal certainty. If a dominant under-
taking cannot further develop (technologically integrate) its own product 
because it holds a significant market share (or, in this case, a quasi 
monopoly), this would mean that a new, special category of intellectual 
property rights exists for dominant undertakings. One must admit that 
tying may (and often does) serve as a tool for market expansion, pre-
serving the monopolist’s market power, or for competition with rivals. 
82 Ahlborn and Evans (n 65).
83 Apparently, about 2,000 copies have been sold. 
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Nevertheless, tying can also be used as a means of quality improvement, 
cost reduction or reducing price inefficiency. The greatest concern from 
the competition law point of view is when the tying is done by a domi-
nant undertaking, and European case law in that respect views it almost 
as illegal per se.84 Schmidt states that ‘the commercial practice of tying, 
when analysed from an economic point of view, can have pro-competitive 
efficiencies, and thus should ideally be viewed as prohibited only when 
it has significant anti-competitive effect’.85 This means that an effects-
based approach, like the one used by the Commission in this case, is 
essential.
Bearing all the above in mind, the facts are the following: the Com-
mission found the impugned tying as abusive conduct leading to foreclo-
sure of the market, yet the market, six years later, has not been foreclo-
sed. Thus, the media player market has not been foreclosed, although the 
exercise of Microsoft’s intellectual property rights concerning Windows 
and WMP has been limited. 
4. Conclusion
The Microsoft saga shows that is not easy to strike the right balance 
between intellectual property rights and competition law. It took six years 
for the Commission to render a decision, because it was engaged in deta-
iled analyses of Microsoft’s behaviour and its impact on the competition. 
The creation of a work that can be or is protected by intellectual 
property right(s) requires an enormous amount of work, knowledge and 
other financial and/or technical resources. There are two different sets of 
interests; those of the creator to be adequately rewarded for his creative 
work and investments, and those of the public, to be able to benefit from 
the creation/invention. 
On the other hand, the free market and undistorted competition are 
also common values recognised by the Treaties, legislation and case law. 
As with intellectual property, competition law also aims at constant inno-
vation, consumer welfare and development. It ensures that competition 
on the merits is present and continues to be present on the market. 
When intellectual property rights, as a fundamental right, becomes 
an obstacle to other common values, such as free competition and other 
market freedoms, its holder may be limited in exercising that fundamen-
84 See Hilti and Tetra Pak II (n 59 & 60).
85 Hedvig Schmidt, Competition Law, Innovation and Antitrust: An Analysis of Tying and 
Technological Integration (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2009) 25. Schmidt proposes a 
new three-step test, ie a new regulatory model to analyse tying, see pages 249-251, and in 
more detail pages 179-249.
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tal right. However, this limitation must be restricted and applied only in 
completely justified situations. Nevertheless, the conditions under which 
the limitation of the exercise of intellectual property rights is justified 
must be precise, excluding any room for discretion, and must be known 
in advance.   
In the Microsoft case, the Commission was concerned that Microsoft 
used its intellectual property to leverage its dominant position in the PC 
operating system market onto the adjacent work group server operating 
systems market, and that it also tried to expand its dominance on the 
media player market. In order to establish whether Microsoft’s behaviour 
amounted to abusive conduct, the Commission applied certain tests set 
out by previous case law. In this article, the author has tried to show that 
certain elements of those tests contain vague terms which may result in 
the tests being too easily fulfilled, so that conduct might be (wrongly) con-
sidered as abusive. In the case of the refusal to supply interoperability 
information, the requirement of a new product of technical development 
seems to be particularly problematic; it may be that this ‘exceptional 
circumstance’ is too easy to accomplish, which means it is no longer an 
exception. In the tying part of the case, the assessment of the separate 
product element seems not to have been applied correctly. The author 
argues that the Commission should, in her view, always have in mind 
average consumer demand. 
If the proposed tests are too easy to accomplish, the exercise of in-
tellectual property is put at risk, and the ratio of the existence of IPR is 
endangered. In addition, the legal uncertainty thus provoked can reduce 
incentives to invest, and this automatically lessens the general public 
good, and may even encourage the free-ride phenomenon.
Therefore, there is an indispensable and urgent need to establish 
new, or redefine present tests or other rules in competition law, to en-
courage innovation and foster consumer welfare, while at the same time 
achieving a balance between exercising intellectual property rights as 
fundamental rights and ensuring a free competitive market. Alternative-
ly, the concept of the duration of intellectual property rights must change 
in a way that retains enough rewards for their holders and maintains 
incentives to innovate, while not creating barriers to the freedom of com-
petition.
